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# SHALL AMERICA PREPARE AGAINST JAPAN ?

BY K. K. KAWAKAMI

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THE problem of preparedness is a delicate problem for a "hyphenated" resident to discuss. If he advances a view not favorable to the promotion of its cause, he is likely to be suspected of scheming, in the interest of his native land, to lull the public into a sense of security and thus counteract the vigorous movement advocated by patriotic Americans. Yet, if he be honest, he cannot compromise his views for the sake of popularity.

It is not my intention to argue either for or against the preparedness programme now under consideration at Washington. With the American desire to establish a larger army and navy no foreign nation, least of all Japan, should have any quarrel—though we may, with Lord Rosebery, privately regret that "the United States should voluntarily take up the burden which, after this war, will be found to have broken our backs." If my discourse seems to run counter to the contentions of the advocates of greater armament, it is not because I wish to discourage them. I shall try to set forth facts and facts alone, and let the reader draw his own conclusion.

It is significant that, in the present agitation for the increase of armament, Japan is held up before the public as a possible enemy or rival. When the General Navy Board at Washington adopted, in October, 1903, a programme calling for the construction of 34 battleships before 1920, Japan cut no figure in the consideration of the naval authorities. When in 1907 Mr. Roosevelt began to urge the speedy execution of the programme of 1903, Japan was still only vaguely thought of as a nation against which America should prepare. From that time, however, the Mikado's Empire was, in the eyes of the American people, gradually looming up on the political horizon of the Pacific. Thanks to the San Francisco

school incident, the immigration question, the Magdalena Bay incident, and the California land legislation, an unthinking public has become obsessed with the idea that sooner or later Japan will demand a reckoning with the United States. In the present armament propaganda, public attention, especially on the Western coast, seems to be almost equally divided between Germany and Japan. We may ignore the irresponsible utterances of certain publicists, but we cannot overlook the fact that a sense of fear and suspicion with regard to Japan has crept into the minds of Americans. The fear is as yet vague and undefinable, but it is as real as it is persistent.

It is useless to reiterate that the Magdalena Bay scare was deliberately conjured up by certain sinister elements eager to fish in troubled waters and anxious to see the United States annex at least the northern section of Mexico. It is useless to assure the American public that the Japanese Government and the Japanese people know well that the immigration question and the California land question are not the kind of questions to be settled satisfactorily by the arbitrament of the sword. It is useless to tell them that Japan's policy in China is not going to be detrimental to the open door policy proclaimed by the late Secretary Hay. These are times when convincing arguments do not convince.

Yet it is to be hoped that authentic data as to the relative strength of the Japanese and American navies, as well as certain issues which claim the first attention of the publicists of the two countries, will be found conducive to the alleviation of the nervousness now taking hold of the American people.

If I remember correctly, it was Mr. Roosevelt who first began to urge preparedness as a means of keeping out Oriental—and more especially Japanese—immigration. In May, 1909, he published in *The Outlook* an article on Japanese immigration in which he said: "We have the right to say, for instance, what immigrants shall come to our own shores, but we are powerless to enforce this right against any nation that chooses to disregard our wishes unless we continue to build up and maintain a first-class fighting navy."

Since this clarion call for preparedness was sounded, many a publicist of less prominence has responded to it, and to-day Japan is undoubtedly thought of as a menace to America's future. I do not believe that the immigration question has ever been regarded by Japan as an issue to be settled by

war. Presuming, however, that the Mikado really wished to argue his side of the controversy in terms of shot and shell, has he ever possessed, and will he ever possess, a navy powerful enough to justify such a course? That is the point which we must first determine.

Let us, then, study the existing naval strength of Japan as well as the programme which she has adopted for the construction of additional warships. At present Japan's fighting fleet consists of six dreadnoughts (total tonnage 191,500), including two now under construction, four battle cruisers (total tonnage 82,500), thirteen battleships of the old style (total tonnage 193,666), four armored cruisers (total tonnage 56,700), fifty destroyers (total tonnage 36,118), and seventeen submarines. All in all, Japan's fighting craft aggregate 560,484 tons.

As against this strength, the American Navy, as it stands to-day, consists of nineteen dreadnoughts (total tonnage 506,636), twenty-three battleships (total tonnage 314,906), ten armored cruisers (total tonnage 140,080), sixty-two destroyers (total tonnage 73,097), fifty-one submarines, and twenty-two colliers (total tonnage 236,401). This makes a grand total of 1,271,120 tons—i. e., 710,636 tons more than the Japanese fleet.

Even a cursory survey of the above figures convinces us that the Mikado's fighting fleet is far inferior to the American. But when we scrutinize more carefully the character and equipment of the ships on both sides, the discrepancy becomes all the more obvious. In the first place, the American dreadnoughts are much larger than the Japanese. Of the American fleet the seven largest dreadnoughts have each a displacement of 32,500 tons, while the four largest Japanese dreadnoughts are of a displacement of 30,600 tons each. Again, as against six American dreadnoughts of 27,500 tons each, Japan has only four battle-cruisers of the same size. The remaining two Japanese battleships displace 20,800 tons each, whereas the United States has two dreadnoughts of 27,243 tons each, two of 21,825 tons each, two of 20,000 tons each, and two of 16,000 tons each. In modern naval warfare the dreadnought is the cornerstone of a fighting fleet. In spite of the increasing efficiency of the submarine, this theory has not been altered. Not only in point of numbers but also in the size of each vessel, the American fleet of dreadnoughts is far superior to the Japanese.

I am fully aware that the tonnage of a warship is not the only, or even the most important, criterion of efficiency. Much of the fighting power of a man-of-war depends upon the kind of guns with which she is armed. How does the American Navy stand in this respect?

Of the nineteen dreadnoughts of the American Navy, five are equipped with twelve 14-inch guns, four with ten 14-inch guns, two with twelve 12-inch guns, four with ten 12-inch guns, and two with eight 12-inch guns. The remaining two dreadnoughts which are now under construction and which are not yet named will probably be of the type of the *California*, and will be equipped with twelve 14-inch guns. On the Japanese side, there is not a single dreadnought equipped with so many as twelve 14-inch guns. To go into details, four of the six Japanese dreadnoughts have only ten 14-inch guns, while two are equipped with twelve 12-inch guns. The Japanese battle-cruisers, four in all, have each only eight 14-inch guns.

It is obvious that the fighting power of a navy cannot be estimated by the number of the ships of which it is composed. Much depends upon the number and the kind of guns with which each vessel is equipped. In point of numbers the American dreadnoughts are almost twice as powerful as the Japanese dreadnoughts and battle-cruisers combined, but when the power of the guns on both sides is taken into consideration, the American dreadnoughts are nearly three times as powerful as the Japanese.

Let us turn our attention to the battleships of the pre-dreadnought period. I have said that Japan has thirteen of such ships, aggregating 193,666 tons, as against America's twenty-three with a total displacement of 314,906 tons. In the face of these figures the superiority of the American fleet of battleships cannot be disputed. Yet when it is known that only two of thirteen Japanese battleships are fit to stand on the first line of battle, as against six of the American fleet, the inferiority of the Japanese Navy becomes the more apparent.

On the American side there are sixty-two destroyers, and on the Japanese side fifty. Here the discrepancy is not, *prima facie*, very great. But we must remember, what is more vital, that the majority of American destroyers are seagoing, having a displacement greater than 800 tons each, while the Mikado's Navy has only six destroyers above 800

tons. Thus sixty-two American destroyers have a total displacement of 73,097 tons, which is more than twice the total tonnage of fifty destroyers of Japan.

As most of the Japanese destroyers are for the purpose of coast defense, so are the Japanese submarines, of which there are only seventeen as against America's fifty-one. While the Japanese submarines are mostly not seagoing, the majority of the American submarines are of a large type, and therefore seagoing.

Last but not least, we must remember that the American Navy has 22 colliers aggregating 236,401 tons, while Japan has none. In a naval expedition to distant waters the collier is as important as the fighting craft, for without fuel no warship can move. The Japanese Navy, being intended to protect Japanese and Chinese waters and not to send expeditions to distant lands, has made no such elaborate provision for supplying its warships with fuel as has been made by the British, German, and American Navies. In case of emergency the Japanese Navy requisitions merchant ships, which are, of course, decidedly unsatisfactory as colliers.

So much for the existing naval strength of Japan as compared with that of the United States. We have seen how insignificant the Japanese fleet is beside the American. And yet this is the fleet which has constantly been held up by scare-mongers and demagogues as the force which the Mikado will some day send across the Pacific to attack the fair coast of California!

But the Japanese, we are told, are feverishly engaged in building new warships. Are they not secretly smarting under the slight which America has meted out to them, and scheming to settle old scores at the point of the bayonet?

Japan has never been "feverishly" engaged in building warships. Has it ever occurred to the average American that as early as 1907 the American Navy was twice as powerful as the Japanese? In the two years that followed America launched six dreadnoughts, while Japan launched only three. The result was that by 1910 the United States had a fleet of warships three times as powerful as the Mikado's, and this ratio has been maintained ever since.

It is significant that while alarmists are raising hysterical cries about the alleged rapid expansion of the Japanese Navy, Japan's naval critics are deeply deploring the utterly "unprepared" condition of their country. As an instance

of their lamentation I quote the following passage from a series of ten articles written by the naval expert of the *Jiji-Shimpo*, assuredly the most reliable newspaper in Japan:

It is regrettable that while other Powers have each been pursuing a definite naval policy, our Navy should be permitted to drift with no preconceived plan. The United States adopted, as early as October 19, 1903, the principle which is in reality the foundation of the stupendous naval programme formulated by Secretary Daniels. According to the programme of 1903 the United States was to build thirty-four dreadnoughts in seventeen years.

Turning to Europe, we see that Germany adopted a naval-repletion programme in 1907, Russia in 1911, France in 1912, Italy in 1910, and Austria in 1912. In the meantime we were lagging hopelessly behind these Powers. When at last we awakened to our own sluggishness and decided upon a programme last year, it was only on a ridiculously small scale.

In these two paragraphs is expressed the universal feeling of uneasiness which the Japanese entertain over what they consider the aggressive naval policies of Europe and America. Let us study Japan's new naval programme, which the *Jiji-Shimpo's* naval expert tells us is "on a ridiculously small scale," and compare it with the great programme proposed by Secretary Daniels.

The Japanese programme, adopted last September by the National Defense Council, calls for the construction, in the five years from 1917 to 1921, of four dreadnoughts, six cruisers, ten destroyers, and nine submarines. For the execution of this programme Japan is to expend \$85,000,000 in five yearly installments.

Beside this modest programme the American programme looks prodigious. It calls for the building of ten battleships, six battle-cruisers, ten scout-cruisers, fifty destroyers, fifteen seagoing submarines, eighty-five coast submarines, four gun-boats, one hospital ship, two ammunition ships, two fuel oil ships, and one repair ship. This requires an expenditure of \$422,964,087 in the five years from 1917 to 1921. This enormous expenditure is for new ships alone. In addition to it, \$48,518,127 is to be expended for the completion of the dreadnoughts for which work has already been begun. Nor is that all: for the plan provides for an appropriation of \$6,000,000 for naval aviation and \$25,000,000 for reserve ammunitions. All told, the five-year programme entails an expenditure of \$502,482,214.

Assuming that this stupendous plan were adopted, let us picture the relative strength of the Japanese and American Navies at the end of 1921, when their respective programmes will have been carried out. Leaving out of consideration minor ships such as gunboats, hospital ships, ammunition and repair ships, with which Japan is ill-supplied, the relative position of the two navies by 1921 will be as follows:

	America.	Japan.
Dreadnoughts .....	27	8
Battle-cruisers .....	6	4
Battleships .....	25	15
Cruisers .....	20	10
Destroyers .....	112	60
Submarines .....	151	27
Colliers .....	24	0

It must be noted that two American ships which are at present classified as dreadnoughts, and two Japanese ships likewise so designated, are, in the above table, counted among battleships, because by 1921 they will have become too old and out-of-date to be called dreadnoughts. A glance at the table shows that the American fleet will be more than twice as powerful as the Japanese. But as I have already said, the American ships are equipped with a larger number of more powerful guns than are the Japanese vessels. Then, too, the majority of American destroyers and submarines are seagoing, while Japanese destroyers and submarines, except a few, are all intended for coast defense. Moreover, the American Navy has the advantage over the Japanese in that it has a large number of the most up-to-date auxiliary ships, such as fuel-oil ships, repair ships, hospital and ammunition ships. When all these facts are taken into consideration, it becomes evident that the American Navy to be built in pursuance of the Administration programme will be almost four times as powerful as the Japanese Navy. Heretofore, the boast of the Japanese Navy, if it really had anything to boast of, has been its battle-cruisers, combining the fighting power of the dreadnought with the speed of the cruiser. The speed of our battle-cruisers during the war with Russia was a marvel to the enemy. Since then the naval Powers of Europe have followed Japan's example and have been building a powerful fleet of battle-cruisers. Strange to say, America has been slow in following suit, and



has been building only battleships of the dreadnought type. But now the American Navy has awakened to its deficiency in this respect, and, in Secretary Daniel's programme, six battle-cruisers are provided for.

Even if Congress rejected Secretary Daniel's measure, and authorized the building of a smaller number of vessels in pursuance of the principle first inaugurated in 1903, while Japan followed the programme adopted last year, the result would still be that by 1921 the American Navy would have at least twice the strength of the Japanese.

Such, in short, is the "navalism" of Japan—the specter which certain publicists, having their own axes to grind, are constantly exploiting to further their ends. While we are perfectly willing to accept President Wilson's assurance that his naval programme is for self-defense and not for aggression, we fear that other nations will feel that this unprecedented plan of America's has other designs than mere self-defense. There is, indeed, a tone of sinister and cynical frankness in these words published in the official organ of the Navy League at Washington:

There should be no doubt that, even with all possible moral refinements, it is the absolute right of a nation to live in its fullest intensity, to expand, to found colonies, to get richer and richer by any proper means, such as armed conquest. Such expansion as an aim is an inalienable right, and in the case of the United States it is a particular duty.

Those who fear, or pretend to fear, Japan's "navalism," point to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and give warning that in the event of rupture between Japan and the United States, Great Britain would throw the whole weight of her mighty navy on the Japanese side of the scale. These wiseacres are ignorant that Great Britain will in the near future enter into a general arbitration treaty with this country, and that the Anglo-Japanese alliance contains the following provision:

Should either High Contracting Party conclude a Treaty of General Arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such Treaty of Arbitration is in force.

Even in the absence of such a clause of exemption, the Japanese know that England would not unsheath the sword to aid them in their combat with America.

I have shown that the Mikado's Navy is too weak to cope with the American Navy. It would be superfluous to dwell upon the geographical difficulties which Japan would have to surmount—if they are surmountable—in waging an aggressive war against America. I may, however, touch upon this particular phase of the problem by quoting a Japanese naval officer, a veteran of the Russo-Japanese War. Early in 1910, when Captain Hobson and others were diligently applying themselves to the task of creating the ghost of Japanese designs upon Magdalena Bay, I was in Washington, and talked with Commander Tokutaro Hiraga, naval attaché of the Japanese Embassy. The commander, who as a rule was reticent, waxed almost eloquent when our conversation turned to Captain Hobson's prediction of a war between Japan and America, and expressed himself very freely on the impossibility of such a war. Emphasizing the difficulty of protecting a transport on a long voyage, he said:

During the Russian War Japan had a fleet of warships guarding the six transports employed in carrying troops and ammunitions across the straits of Korea, only eighty miles wide. Yet these transports were attacked and sunk by three Russian cruisers. What would happen if we tried to convoy a fleet of transports across the Pacific to a point 5,700 miles away? To transport a real army across the ocean we would have to impress every steamer afloat in our waters. Has it ever occurred to you that a steamer can carry only fifty soldiers per 100 tons of displacement? It is 3,455 miles from Japan to Hawaii, and 2,288 miles more from Hawaii to San Francisco. Even a Hercules would not be so reckless as to attempt an invasion of California with such an inadequate navy as ours.

We have seen that Japan is neither prepared nor preparing for a military expedition to America. Now the question is whether there are any issues likely to precipitate an armed conflict between the two nations.

The late Count Tadasu Hayashi, the veteran diplomat of Japan, in his posthumous memoirs, says:

The three questions between Japan and America are the immigration question, the school question, and the problem of China. Not one of these can possibly lead to a war between the two countries. . . . The feeling between the two nations is cordial. Japan regards America as her benefactor, and she is deeply indebted to her for much help and many improvements. In reality, the feelings of Japan for America are as cordial as they were fifty years ago. There are some people who assert that Japan has ambitions on the Philippines and on Hawaii. Any person possessing common sense

can realize what madness it would be for Japan to deprive so powerful a nation as America of her valuable possessions.

This utterance coming, as it does, from a man noted for his straightforwardness, and found in a document never intended by its author for publication, is especially remarkable. Since Count Hayashi penned those words, the San Francisco school question has disappeared from the diplomatic horizon, and to-day there remain only the immigration and the Chinese questions. And yet, as far as the Japanese Government is concerned, the immigration question has been settled through the instrumentality of a "gentlemen's agreement." When that agreement began to work effectively in 1909, Japanese immigration to the continental United States fell to 2,432, from 9,544 for the preceding year. Against 2,432 admitted in that year, 5,004 Japanese departed from these shores. Again, in 1910 only 2,598 were admitted, while 5,024 returned to Japan. Since 1911, Japanese immigration gradually increased, until, in 1915, it reached 9,029. But it must be remembered that the increase is mainly due to the fact that those Japanese who went home on a visit in the preceding few years have gradually been coming back to this country; for the Japanese Government has not been sending any new immigrants. That this statement is in the main correct can be judged from the fact that in the seven years from 1909 to 1915, 38,932 Japanese entered continental United States, while 39,248 departed for Japan. It must also be kept in mind that the year 1915 was the Exposition year, bringing many Japanese to San Francisco in connection with the Panama-Pacific International Exposition, for which Japan expended \$700,000 in spite of California's ungenerous attitude towards her.

To be frank, America ought to be thankful that she finds in Japan an efficient Government to deal with in the adjustment of the immigration question. The Tokio Government has been handling the matter so effectively, skilfully, and honestly that no Japanese has ever been smuggled into this country. With the recent sensational story of the smuggling of Chinese before us, have not the people of California reason to be glad that the Federal Government, in dealing with Japan, is not dealing with such an inefficient Government as that of China? As for the anti-Japanese land law of California, its wisdom or unwisdom may be gauged from the official statement of Mr. George Robertson, statistician of the Cali-

ifornia Board of Agriculture, to the effect that in 1914 the Japanese in California owned only 218 town lots with an assessed value of \$136,955, and 331 farms totaling 12,726 acres, and having an assessed value of \$478,990. There has never been, and never will be, a wholesale purchase of California land by Japanese.

Not only is the Japanese Government restricting emigration to the United States, but it is most carefully restricting it as well to Mexico and Canada. In spite of all the insinuations which sensational American journals are publishing with regard to the alleged Japanese activities in Mexico, there are only about 3,400 Japanese in all Mexico, and the number is fast decreasing because of the chaotic political conditions in that country.

It is important to note the difference between the situation in Hawaii and the situation in California or on the Pacific Coast. Some critics point to Hawaii as an example of the orientalization of the American soil, and give warning that California must not become a second Hawaii. The fact is that California will never become a second Hawaii, even if she wanted to become such, because the conditions prevailing there are radically different from those in Hawaii. To appreciate this it is only necessary to know something of the history of the sugar industry in the islands. To begin with, Hawaii was not a white man's land; it was inhabited by dark-skinned, semi-civilized natives. And when the white men secured the privilege to exploit its resources they brought all sorts of Oriental labor by the shipload for the sugar plantations. The country had neither a white population nor "white civilization" when the planters began to import Oriental laborers.

The conditions on the Pacific Coast are totally different. Here American civilization and a Caucasian population have been so firmly established that Japanese immigration, so strictly checked by the "gentlemen's agreement," cannot possibly become a danger.

Nor can arguments advanced against Chinese immigration prior to the enactment of the Chinese exclusion laws be applied to the Japanese immigration of to-day. Chinese immigration from 1854 to 1882 totalled 138,455, the overwhelming majority of which came to and remained in California. In view of the fact that in the seventies of the past century, when agitation for Chinese exclusion was begun, the State of

California had a population of only 560,000, including Negroes, Indians, and Chinese, the apprehension that the Chinese might hinder the wholesome growth of the white community in the State was not without ground. But the conditions on the Pacific Coast have since radically changed, while circumstances attendant upon Japanese immigration are widely different from those accompanying Chinese immigration. In 1900 the white population of California increased to 1,402,727, and in 1910 to 2,259,672. It is difficult to ascertain the number of Japanese in the State. The census of 1910 places it at 41,356. While this seems to be a conservative estimate, it is perhaps no more conservative than the number given for the white population. Perhaps the common estimate, which places the number of Japanese at 60,000, is not far from the mark, although much of it consists of floating elements contemplating a return to Japan, or, to a lesser extent, a move to other States. This number will probably remain stationary, if it does not materially decrease, because of the fact that the gap left by departing Japanese will be filled by children born of Japanese parents in the State.

With the "gentlemen's agreement" strictly enforced, with Americans flowing into California from the Eastern States in ever increasing streams, with the opening of the Panama Canal stimulating European immigration, there is no reason why California should apprehend the "orientalization" of the State.

As far as immigration is concerned, therefore, the Japanese Government does not regard it as a vital issue. It does not intend, as it never intended, to force emigration upon the United States. This is not, of course, to say that Japan does not care to send emigrants to the United States. Indeed, she wishes that America would look at the matter in a different light; but if she has to choose between America's friendship and emigration, she will without a moment's hesitation prefer the former. Moreover, we must credit the Japanese statesmen with the ability to foresee that the immigration question cannot be solved at the point of the sword, for an armed conflict must inevitably intensify race hatred, and thus defeat the very purpose for which the war is waged. What Japan wants, then, is not emigration, but just treatment of the small number of Japanese who are already domiciled in this country.

This, in short, is the real status of the immigration ques-

tion, much talked about but little understood. If America cannot tolerate even such a conciliatory attitude on the part of the Japanese, it will perhaps behoove her to bend her energies to the upbuilding of a great navy, for her relentless pursuit will ultimately drive the Japanese to the point where they will have to make their last desperate stand. We have too great a faith in the wisdom and sagacity of the American people to think for a moment that they will ever play such an unprofitable game.

Perhaps a greater danger lies in the Chinese question, if America, relying upon the great naval prowess which she is now trying to attain, be determined to enforce her will in that part of the world. For here Japan will show herself unyielding. She thinks, and with good reason, that she has already made concession enough to the United States in regard to the immigration question, and expects the United States to show a similar spirit of concession in dealing with her in regard to the affairs of the Orient. Japan firmly believes that the measures she has taken in China are intended for the mutual benefit of China and herself, and for the prevention of the political encroachment of Western Powers upon her ancient neighbor. She is equally certain that the "open door" in China has not been closed by her hands. Surely America will not be so short-sighted as to display her superior naval strength by bullying the Japanese out of the country with which their destiny is so closely interwoven.

K. K. KAWAKAMI.

### COMMENT BY THE EDITOR

Mr. Kawakami deprecates the idea that the United States should prepare against Japan; and he bases his argument mainly on the statement that the United States Navy is much greater than the Japanese.

That our navy is greater than the Japanese may be granted at once, if one includes in a navy only such things as battleships, cruisers and other water craft. Mr. Kawakami seems to do so; for his statement of the forces on both sides includes only dreadnoughts, battlecruisers, "battleships of the old style," armored cruisers, destroyers and submarines; with the addition also, for the United States, of twenty-two colliers. He makes no mention of airships and aeroplanes, though it is well known that in these essential

craft, Japan's navy far outstrips the United States Navy.

The data which Mr. Kawakami gives as to the actual tonnage in naval craft possessed by the two Powers, while approximately correct, according to information held in this country, indicates a disparity greater than our information indicates. Furthermore, the data are based on published statements, though the feeling is everywhere prevalent that the Government of Japan has been making large profits from the sale of munitions to the Allies, and that these profits are being expended in building war craft in the censured seclusion of the dockyards of the Government. Nothing more natural, more wise, or more proper could be done with those profits. The position of the Japanese Islands, lonely and small, inhabited by a race virile, ambitious and brave, requires just such measures of foresight and decision. All honor to Japan for her sturdy spirit. We wish there were more of that spirit in the hundred million people inhabiting the United States.

But let us grant that the disparity in war craft between the two navies is as great as Mr. Kawakami thinks; what is the disparity in trained officers and men? Here the disparity is reversed; for the Japanese navy has, including trained reservists, more than ten per cent. of officers and men than have we. A navy cannot fight more ships than it has men with whom to fight them.

From this point of view, we see that the Japanese Navy, so far as successful fighting is concerned, is ten per cent. *greater* than ours! Even, however, if we should admit that, in number of ships and men, our navy were superior to the Japanese, we should remember that that superiority in actual war would be effective in one case only—the case in which the Japanese fleet operated as far away from her coast, or nearly as far away, as the United States fleet did from hers. But if, for instance, our fleet had to go to Japanese waters to carry on a war, as the Russian fleet did, it would be under such disadvantages in the matter of getting fuel and supplies, and in making needed repairs, that the net advantage would probably be on the Japanese side, instead of on ours. For instance, if the Japanese should take the Philippine Islands, either because they wanted them, or because they did not want the United States to keep them, they could easily capture them, and land so large an army that it would be impossible for us to take them back, without

sending a highly trained army of greater size, and carried in transports far more numerous, than it has ever yet entered into the American mind to conceive. The practical difficulties of successfully convoying so many helpless vessels over so great a distance into hostile seas would be almost insuperable, as would also be the difficulties of supporting our troops when landing in the face of active opposition. The mere sustaining of our fleet so far away from any kind of base, and in the face of the attacks that would be made by submarines, air craft, destroyers and other vessels, would be a feat never yet accomplished by any navy. So we see that even if our fleet could defeat the Japanese, if the Japanese attacked our continental coasts, it could not protect the Philippine Islands from capture, and might not be able to retake them after they were captured.

The admission just made that the United States fleet could defeat the Japanese, if Japan attacked our Western coast, assumed that our entire fleet could leave the East coast and go to the West coast. Perhaps it would be safe to do so, and perhaps not; sometimes it would be safe, and sometimes not. Surely it would not be safe now. If Japan should attack our West coast now, would we send our fleet there? Remember, the Panama Canal will be untrustworthy for some time to come. Even after it shall have gone into successful operation, we shall look at it very critically, when the question of trusting our entire fleet in it may come up. We do not wish to have the canal break down just when half our ships have got through; or even after the entire fleet may have gone through in safety to the Pacific; for it would take it two months to get back to our Eastern coast, by way of Magellan's Straits.

People in the United States are not "nervous," as Mr. Kawakami fears, about Japan; or about Germany, Great Britain or any other Power or Powers. On the contrary, they are nerveless about them, and will probably continue to be so, until shells begin to fall in their back yards. Some of them do feel, however, that while Japan has no intention of attacking us just now, she may strike, swiftly and effectively, when some other Power attacks us on the East coast, or when tension with some other Power is so great that we would be afraid to send the fleet into the Pacific.

Bear in mind that the United States has no ally, and that Japan has several.—THE EDITOR.